When Candidates and Vote Distribution Matter: A New Indicator of Electoral Competitiveness by Gherghina, Sergiu & Tseng, Huan-Kai
Research & Methods
ISSN 1234-9224 Vol. 21 (1, 2012): 55–68
Institute of Philosophy and Sociology
Polish Academy of Sciences, Warsaw
www.i span.waw.pl
e-mail: publish@i span.waw.pl
When Candidates and Vote Distribution Matter: 
A New Indicator of Electoral Competitiveness
Sergiu Gherghina
International Data Infrastructures GESIS Cologne
Huan-Kai Tseng
Department of Political Science George Washington University
The electoral competitiveness among candidates vying for single elected positions 
(e.g. president, members of parliament single member districts, or candidates for the 
party leadership) lacks an appropriate measurement. This study reevaluates previous 
measurements and proposes a new indicator that accounts for the interaction between 
the number of candidates and the distribution of votes. The resulting indicator overcomes 
the oversensitivity problem associated with earlier speci cation and provides better 
competitiveness estimate for various electoral settings. Its applicability is universal and 
allows for cross-cases and longitudinal comparisons for a wide variety of single-winner 
elections.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Political competition lies at the heart of contemporary representative democracies. 
Its effects on a large number of electoral and political processes lead to a series 
of attempts to develop valid and reliable measures. Whereas the electoral 
competitiveness between political parties has been approached differently in 
various studies (Key 1949; Mayhew 1974; Ranney 1976; Bibby 1990; Przeworski 
1991; Holbrook and van Dunk 1993; Vanhanen 1997; Hall 2001; Besley and 
Preston 2002; Bibby and Holbrook 2001), considerable less attention has been 
devoted to the competition between individual candidates for a single post. A few 
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examples of competitions falling in this category are the presidential and local 
elections (i.e. the mayor), elections in single member districts, or intra-party 
leadership selection. 
When referring to competitiveness, Mayhew (1974) employed the margin 
between the two largest parties. Adapted to individual contexts, the competitiveness 
is re ected by the margin between the two main candidates. Similarly, the 
measurement proposed by Vanhanen (1997) for the electoral competition between 
political parties can be transposed in the setting of elections among individuals: 
the competitiveness is given by the share of the vote won by the most popular 
candidate. The major shortcoming of both indicators is that they ignore the number 
of candidates and the distribution of votes among candidates other than the  rst 
two in the case of Mayhew and the most popular candidate for Vanhanen. 
Two supplementary indicators were reviewed by Kenig (2009): the incumbents’ 
success rate and the likelihood of contests (direct coronations). Their weaknesses 
have been carefully revealed by the author: the incumbents’ success rate refers only 
to contests in which incumbents participate and where challengers are formally 
organized, whereas the coronations differentiates between single-candidate and 
multi-candidate instances (Kenig 2009, 244-245). To overcome these shortcomings, 
Kenig constructs an index – effective number of candidates (ENC) – based on the 
commonly used effective number of parties (ENP) index (Laakso and Taagepera 
1979). And he incorporates “the absolute number of candidates” (denoted by N) 
into the ENC formula as the denominator to re ect “the extent to which the number 
of candidates had shrunk” (electoral competitiveness) (Kenig 2009, 246). 
Although this is so far the most sophisticated solution to account for competition 
for a single post developed, as we will demonstrate shortly, simulation analysis 
suggests that this index suffers from sensitivity (to the number of candidates) and 
identi cation problem resulting from N’s larger marginal effects and the upper 
bound limit imposed by Kenig’s model speci cation. This article proposes a new 
competitiveness index that alleviates these problems and improves the estimation 
precision through more ef cient use of vote distribution in formation. Our 
competitiveness indicator is thus robust to and facilitates comparison of various 
kinds of electoral setting that involve different number of candidates and diverse 
vote distribution patterns in single-winner elections.
2. PROBLEMS WITH THE ENC/N INDEX
ENC/N is a decreasing function of the interaction term N * !Vi
2. Kenig added an 
N term to normalize his ENC index on a 0-1 scale with an aim to “re ect the 
distribution of votes and [will] neutralize the effect of the absolute number of 
candidates”; however, only scant attention is paid to the behavior of the marginal 
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effects of this interaction term when its two components, N and !Vi
2, are evaluated 
at the opposite extremes. 
Figure 1 shows how the curvature of the ENC/N index surface changes when 
!Vi
2 and N are evaluated across their full range of values.1 At higher levels of !Vi
2 
(higher concentration of votes in a few candidates), smaller N makes the ENC/N 
index more competitive, as exhibited in the quick “jump” in curvature in the 
direction of N when the absolute value of N falls under 2-a phenomenon which 
is empirically unsound. In addition, note that as !Vi
2 approaches 0, the ENC/N 
index shoots up to its maximum value (1) regardless of the parameter value on the 
N-axis, as shown in the light-colored trapezoid-shape area in the upper right corner 
of this plot, causing identi cation problem in this area when one tries to compare 
the relative competitiveness among contests with different size of N. Apparently, 
Kenig’s speci cation fails to achieve its intended purposes.
Figure 1 ENC/N as a Function of !Vi2 and N
We argue that these biases are rooted in the multiplicative nature of the ENC/N 
index’s denominator term. First, recall that Kenig’s ENC/N index is just the inverse 
of the multiplicative term N * !Vi
2 ! i = 1,…, N. Theoretically speaking, as N 
increases, at the margin, it tends to pull votes away from major contenders because 
more candidates always present more alternatives for selectorates, which makes 
the distribution of votes less concentrated. According to Kenig (2009, 236), a more 
equal distribution of votes would make the contests more competitive. 
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However, ENC/N is decreasing in both N and !Vi
2 through the composite 
denominator term N * !Vi
2, and in Kenig’s speci cation N is any integers " 2 while 
!Vi
2 is bounded between 0 and 1,2 it is easy to see that the marginal effect of N 
drives down the ENC/N score faster than !Vi
2. When we compare two elections 
with similar vote distribution patterns, the election with more fringe candidates 
will receive much lower ENC/N estimate owing to N’s much larger diminishing 
marginal effect than that of !Vi
2.
Even in instances with the same number of candidates the ENC/N index is 
slightly problematic as it is in uenced by the share of votes received by the winner. 
If this is small, then the index is large (see H1 and H4). Apart from this, his index is 
quite sensitive to the vote share received by small competitors and to the number 
of competitors (at the expense of difference between the  rst two candidates). 
A practical illustration of these shortcomings is re ected in the four hypothetical 
situations listed in Table 1. Elections H1 and H2 illustrate this issue: the vote share 
difference between the  rst three candidates is similar, the share of the winner 
is smaller in H1; At the same time, the share of the least popular candidate is 
higher. Consequently, H1’s competitiveness index goes up. Elections H3 and 
H4 show how the index overestimates the diminishing marginal effect exerted 
by small competitors. The presence of fringe candidates signi cantly alters the 
competitiveness index. 
Table 1 Share of Votes, Number of Candidates, and Competitiveness Index
Vote Share H1 H2 H3 H4
V1 32 33 32 30
V2 28 29 28 28
V3 21 22 21 21
V4 19 16 18 19
V5 1 1
V6 1
ENC/N 0.957 0.936 0.777 0.670
It is worth elaborating the identi cation problem outlined previously. This 
issue is related to Kenig’s attempt to transform the unbounded ENC indicator 
into a bounded index. This is commendable because such treatment allows the 
ENC/N index of the same N-class to be well-behaved within the 0-1 scale, but 
it also constrains our ability to extend our competitiveness analysis of elections 
whose N(s) range across the full range of possible values. Some simple algebraic 
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expressions might help clarify this issue. Suppose for a given election, votes 
are equally distributed among all N candidates, this election’s ENC/N score is 
calculated as
implying the maximum level of competitiveness. Note the maximum value is 
invariant to the size of N. Although Kenig acknowledged his ENC/N index “works 
to its best when the (absolute) number of candidates is equal” (Ibid, 245), one 
is hard-pressed to accept the notion that, when votes are equally distributed, 
candidates in a three-way election face the same level of competitiveness as 
their counterparts in a canonical two-way contest as suggested by their identical 
maximum value (1).3 This built-in identi cation problem presents an estimation 
bias that needed to be reckoned with.
In sum, when vote distribution statistics are similar across elections, the ENC/N 
index tends to underestimate the competitiveness of elections having higher 
number of candidates due to N’s larger diminishing marginal effect and when 
vote shares are perfectly equal among candidates, the index cannot distinguish the 
relative competitiveness among elections with different number of candidates. In 
the next section, we propose a remedy that alleviates these biases but retains N’s 
desirable property.
3. A VARIANCE COMPONENT APPROACH
Drawing on the  ndings of these studies, we seek to correct the sensitivity issues 
that have plagued the previous indicators. Improving upon Kenig’s ENC/N 
index, we address the confounding effect of the interaction between the number 
of candidates and the distribution of votes on competitiveness estimate through 
variance component approach. We then formulate a new composite indicator, the 
Electoral Competitiveness Indicator (ECI), with an aim toward providing a more 
 exible estimator that has the ability to assess competitiveness in a wide range of 
electoral contexts. 
Our task is to  nd a feasible approach to scale down N’s marginal effect without 
altering the diminishing effect it exerts on the ENC/N index through its interaction 
with !Vi
2. We want to achieve this without doing too much violence to Kenig’s 
original ENC/N functional form since it attends appropriately to the interaction 
between N and !Vi
2. Our ECI is composed of two elements, an adjusted ENC 
indicator and a pooling factor, each with its speci c estimation purposes. The 
adjusted ENC indicator, shown in equation (1), dilutes the sensitivity issue by 
= 1=
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using the square root of N in the speci cation; this speci cation also overcomes 
the identi cation problem caused by Kenig’s upper bound normalization as this 
allows the indicator to vary with N. A simple solution is simply to take the square 
root of N and then plug it into the original formula:
                                        , ! i = 1,…, N (1)
Because  shrinks the absolute value of N our adjusted ENC/N index is thus 
less sensitive to the marginal change in N. Also note that our Adj-ENC/N index 
will give a maximum value of  when votes are equally distributed and this 
value is monotonically increasing in N. We regard our unbounded Adj  to 
more faithfully capture the increasing level of competitiveness as a result of more 
equally-competitive candidates entering the race, as compared to the maximum 
value estimated by the ENC/N index which is unconditional on N.
Our attempt to propose electoral competitiveness indicator (ECI) does not stop 
here. Although the Adj  marks an improvement over the original ENC/N index 
in terms of underestimation bias (for elections with large N) and identi cation 
problem, a competitiveness indicator is only useful when it can be used to evaluate 
the relative competitiveness of elections that have diverse vote distribution and 
number of candidates {!Vi
2, N} pro les. If the original ENC/N index works 
(partially)  ne only when the number of candidates is equal, we would like to 
extrapolate our analysis to instances that beyond this constraint. To this aim, an 
adjustment factor would be needed to offset the inherent downward bias imposed 
by the N term in our Adj  indicator.
Empirically, as N increases, it makes the distribution of votes less concentrated 
in major candidates which then causes the election to become more competitive; 
on the contrary, holding N constant, higher !Vi
2 indicates that the distribution of 
votes is concentrated in a handful of candidates (i.e., large !Vi
2), which makes 
the election less competitive. Clearly, two competing effects are at work in 
in uencing electoral competitiveness and their effects are translated through the 
vote distribution mechanism; however, this mechanism is poorly modeled by the 
speci cation of equation (1) because ENC/N is strictly decreasing in both !Vi
2 
and N. The question now comes down to how can we make more ef cient use of 
the information supplied by {!Vi
2, N} to improve our competitiveness estimates 
across cases having diverse N.
Ideally, we need an adjustment factor that can adjudicate the competing effects 
of !Vi
2 and N on vote distribution and allow us to use this information to determine 
the proportion of the variance in electoral competitiveness that should be estimated 
by the estimator derived in (1). A useful  rst step toward the construction of such 
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factor is to conceptualize the relationship between !Vi
2 and N as that between 
variance and sample size n in a random effects model. Unlike classical regression 
analysis where the group-level predictors (!1) and regression mean (") are 
collinear,4 in a random effects model group-level predictors are shrunk toward 
their own estimated value (!# j) for groups with more observation (n) and when 
within-group standard deviation (#j) is small, but there is more pooling toward 
regression mean (") when the between-group standard deviation (#!) is small:
 (2)
This same logic also applies electoral competitiveness analysis. An increase in 
smoothes out marginally the within-election (or between-candidate) vote share 
variance and shrinks the estimate toward this particular election’s Adj  value 
given by equation (1) ; on the contrary, higher !$i
2 implies greater within-election 
vote share variance, which pools the estimate toward the mean estimate ( ). 
By expression (2), we can similarly de ne a pooling factor for election j with N 
candidates:
 (3)
We then multiply expression (3) by equation (1) to denote the proportion of 
electoral competitiveness to be estimated by election j’s unique Adj  value, 
and let (1 - %) proportion of this competitiveness estimate to be pooled toward 
the mean estimate ( ). Adding these two parts together, we get a weighted 
competitiveness estimator, Electoral Competitiveness Indicator (ECI):
  (4)
Clearly, this weighted estimator tends to attribute the original estimator 
(equation (1)) greater weight whenever Nj is large but pools toward the election 
mean when !Vij
2 increases and these partial pooling effects are translated through 
the adjustment factor % because  > 0 and  < 0.
How does the ECI work? Table 2 replicates the same four hypothetical examples 
(H1 to H4) from Table 1 to illustrate the operation of our competitiveness indicator, 
=
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ECI. We complements our analysis with two other hypothetical cases (H5 to H6) 
to examine if the weighted ECI estimate is robust in instances when votes are 
distributed perfectly equal among candidates. The comparison of election H1 to H2 
provides a modal case to elucidate the mechanism of our adjustment factor, %. The 
effect of smaller vote share difference between the pair of two weaker candidates, 
V3 and V4, in H1 (0.2 versus H2’s 0.6) is picked up by H1’s smaller !Vi
2 and translated 
to its higher % value, thereby shrinking the estimate toward H1’s unique Adj . 
Because H1 has higher Adj  estimate (1.915709), it therefore receives a higher 
ECI score than H2. This exercise shows how the ECI uses the information supplied 
by !Vi
2 to adjudicate the relative competitiveness between cases.
Table 2 Share of Votes and Competitiveness of Elections in Six Hypothetical Contexts
Vote Share H1 H2 H3 H4 H5 H6
V1 0.32 0.33 0.32 0.30 0.2 0.166
V2 0.28 0.29 0.28 0.28 0.2 0.166
V3 0.21 0.22 0.21 0.21 0.2 0.166
V4 0.19 0.16 0.18 0.19 0.2 0.166
V5 0.01 0.01 0.2 0.166
V6 0.01 0.166
!Vi
2 0.261 0.267 0.2574 0.2488 0.2 0.1653
N 4 4 5 6 5 6
Adj 1.915709 1.872659 1.737427 1.640869 2.236068 2.469742
! 0.489237 0.483559 0.437254 0.401156 0.500000 0.520400
ECI 1.958762 1.938423 2.018035 2.125107 2.236068 2.557929
We now turn to instances when the elections being compared have different 
number of candidates. The comparison of H1 to H3 highlights the ability of the ECI 
to detect the marginal increase in competitiveness made by the presence of one 
fringe candidate (V5) in H3, the ECI gives a higher competitiveness estimate for 
H3 through more pooling toward its election mean ( , which is higher than H1’s 
( )) despite its having lower Adj  score than that of H1. Also, when two more 
fringe candidates were present and absorb a small share of the vote away from the 
strongest candidate (V1), thus narrowing the vote margin between the two leading 
candidates (V1 and V2), a situation typi ed by scenario H4, our ECI correctly delivers 
a higher competitiveness score for H4 against the baseline scenario H1 as compared 
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to the estimates obtained by using the ENC/N index in Table 1 which incorrectly 
gives election H1 higher competitiveness estimate (0.957854) than H4  (0.669882). 
Finally, we look at election H5 to H6, our analysis shows that even under perfectly 
equal vote share scenario, our ECI still outperforms Kenig’s ENC/N. ECI assigns 
higher score to elections with larger number of candidates (N) as opposed to the 
ENC/N index which is invariant to the marginal change in N when the index is 
evaluated at its maximum value. This brief analysis persuasively demonstrates 
the  exibility and improved precision of our proposed variance component-based 
estimator in comparing competitiveness of electoral contests with unequal N.
4. DISCUSSION
This paper proposes a new measurement of electoral competitiveness between 
candidates running for single posts. In doing so, it re-evaluates extant electoral 
competitiveness measures through simulations and, by tackling the sensitivity and 
identi cation issues that have plagued previous studies, we develop a new estimator, 
ECI. This is robust to the confounding in uence of the interaction between the 
number of candidates and their vote shares. In that respect, our indicator improves 
the estimation precision of previously developed measures (Kenig 2009) through 
more ef cient use of vote distribution information; it is  exible enough to provide 
precise comparative competitiveness estimates across elections with varying 
number and strength of candidates. ECI overcomes the methodological problems 
of the previous measures and proposes a generally valid indicator. This accuracy 
appears to come at the cost of simplicity as the calculations are slightly more 
complex than the existing formulas. To compensate for the somewhat technical 
explanations within the text, Appendix 1 is meant to increase the accessibility of 
more users and explains how the indicator can be computed. 
While the methodological implications of the ECI have been clearly outlined in 
the body of the paper, it provides at least three major empirical bene ts. First, the 
ECI is a universal measure for competitiveness in various electoral competitions 
for a single elected position. It is not sensitive to time or place and allows 
comparability of a broad range of electoral contests. At the same time, it provides 
a standardized measure that allows comparability of results across units of analysis 
over time. On these grounds, the second empirical implication is that ECI can 
be used in a variety of studies ranging from the electoral competitions (e.g. of 
candidates in single-member districts, for presidential elections) to leadership 
positions in organizations (i.e. political parties, administration, civil society etc.). 
Third, it enhances the processes of replication and reliability control. Researchers 
can use the ECI to take a retrospective look at various elections and evaluating 
their level of competitiveness. 
Ask. Vol. 21 (1, 2012): 55–6864
APPENDIX: HOW TO CALCULATE THE ECI
1. Operationalization
To impute the ECI, we need the results of the electoral contests, the number of 
effective candidates (N), and we have to normalize each candidate’s vote share (Vi) 
between 0 and 1. To express this concept formally, assuming there are N candidates
i = 1, 2, 3,…, n, and N > 0,
and each candidate receives Vi’s of total vote in a particular election where:
Vi " [0, 1)
5  and  !1nVi = 1.
2. Computing the ECI
2.1 The adjusted ENC/N index
This “adjusted” index measures the competitiveness of an election. As noted in the 
paper, we want this measure to be able to capture the increasing competitiveness 
resulting from more candidates entering the race without this positive effect being 
overtly diluted by the N term in the denominator. To alleviate N’s larger marginal 
effect (relative to !1nVi2), we use the square root of N in the speci cation and 
operationalize our adjusted ENC/N index as
 , ! i = 1,…, N.  (1)
Note that the adjusted ENC/N index is less sensitive to the marginal change in N 
because the square root scales down the marginal effect of N. This operationalization 
procedure has desirable property in the sense that when votes are equally distributed 
among candidates, as we illustrated in the comparison of scenario H5 and H6 in the 
paper,  speci cation allows the interactive denominator term, * !1nVi2, to 
vary according to changes in N and vote shares distribution among candidates. 
This overcomes the identi cation problem that plagued Kenig’s ENC/N index.
2.2 The pooling factor
Another methodological contribution of this study is that we extend the assessment 
of electoral competitiveness beyond cases with the same number of candidates. 
We want to re-emphasize here that there are two competing effects at work in 
in uencing electoral competitiveness. An increase in N  attens vote distribution, 
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causing elections to be more competitive while higher !Vi2 makes vote 
distribution more concentrated, indicating less electoral competitiveness. As we 
argued in the paper, this mechanism is poorly modeled by the original ENC/N 
index and the speci cation of expression (1) since Adj  is decreasing in both 
!Vi2 and . To extrapolate our analysis beyond this constraint would require 
an adjustment factor to offset the downward bias imposed by the N term without 
discarding useful “competitiveness” information (i.e., relative vote share among 
candidates) contained in the interaction term, * !1nVi2.
We  rst need to construct a pooling factor to partial out the vote share variances 
associated with an election’s (say, election j) unique vote share pattern !Vij2 
from the expected vote share variance of an election with N effective candidates 
which is simply this the mean value,  (i.e., when each candidate receives equal 
vote share, V1 = V2 = … = Vn = , and  is unconditional on the value and the 
distribution of Vi). As we have elucidated in our paper, we use Nj and !Vij
2 to 
approximate the effective number of candidates and within-election vote share 
variance in election j, respectively. We then operationalize the pooling factor % as:
                                   . (3)
Where % determines the amount of vote share variance that are deviated from 
the expected mean estimate and which should be estimated by election-speci c 
competitiveness estimate, Adj . By (1) and (3), we now specify our ECI as 
a weighted estimator:
ECI & (4)
where  is the expected vote share variance which is calculated from 
 = , by (1) and given condition that V1 = V2 = … = 
Vn = . Note that because  =  > 0 and  =  < 0, 
% is increasing in Nj but decreasing in !1
nVij2, a larger effective candidate size, N, 
pools the ECI estimate toward the adjusted ENC/N index, while a larger within-
+
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election vote share variance, !Vij2, makes  a less precise competitive 
estimator and therefore pools the ECI toward the  since the computation of 
the latter does not depend on the information of !Vij2.
3. Application
Now consider the six hypothetical election scenarios from Table 2: 
Vote share H1 H2 H3 H4 H5 H6
V1 0.32 0.33 0.32 0.3 0.2 0.16
V2 0.28 0.29 0.28 0.28 0.2 0.16
V3 0.21 0.22 0.21 0.21 0.2 0.16
V4 0.19 0.16 0.18 0.19 0.2 0.16
V5   0.01 0.01 0.2 0.16
V6    0.01  0.16
We  rst square the Vi value in each column and sum them together to obtain the vote 
share variance for each hypothetical election scenario, !Vij2 for j = 1 to 6.We get:
H1 H2 H3 H4 H5 H6
!Vij2 0.261 0.267 0.2574 0.2488 0.2 0.1536
We then substitute each election’s Nj and !Vij
2 into expression (1) to calculate the 
Adj  for each election scenario, which are given below:       
H1 H2 H3 H4 H5 H6
AdjENC/N 1.915709 1.872659 1.737427 1.640869 2.236068 2.657867
We now compute the relevant statistics required to estimate %. First we use the 
information given in each election scenario’ {Nj, !Vij
2} to obtain their  and 
 (which equals N2). We then use these statistics to calculate %, which is 
simply the ratio of  to the sum of  and  by expression (3).
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H1 H2 H3 H4 H5 H6
 
15.32567 14.98127 19.42502 24.11576 25 39.0625
16 16 25 36 25 36
% 0.489237 0.483559 0.437254 0.401155 0.5 0.5204
Finally, we substitute the values of Adj , % and the expected (unconditional) 
vote share variance,  into expression (3) to get each election’s ECI score:
H1 H2 H3 H4 H5 H6
ECI 1.958762 1.938423 2.018035 2.125107 2.236068 2.557929
NOTES
1  We set N " (1, 4) for illustration purpose.
2  The fact that !$i
2 is a squared term means that the effect of vote share on electoral 
competitiveness has been scaled down.
3  We should also point out that when votes are distributed perfectly equal, as the number 
of candidates increases, the sum of squared per candidate vote share (!$i
2) will decrease, 
so the ENC index will go up. Unfortunately, this increasing competitiveness effect of N 
is entirely offset by the N term that Kenig used to normalize the ENC index.  
4  The between-group variances (#!
2) are assumed to be zero and distributed I.I.D.
5  This condition is necessary because candidates who are effective candidates that enter 
into our computation cannot receive a vote share smaller than or equal to zero.
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